By April of 1940, the British, in part through French information, were made aware of the potential for nuclear weapons, but had concluded that the demands of waging war against Germany in the short term would preclude any British effort. The infeasibility of a British nuclear weapons program, and concern over German work on nuclear weapons to date, were examined as part of the July 1941 MAUD committee report.
5 This report was transmitted to the US, but not until some lobbying by the British, coupled with domestic interest by scientists in the US, 6 did it lead to a strategic awareness of nuclear weapons in Washington. This would eventually lead to the setting up of the Manhattan Project in June of 1942. 7 The trigger was the awareness in the US of both the feasibility of nuclear weapons and apparent German interest in them. 8 The British were initially ahead in both theoretical and practical work on nuclear research, but were unresponsive to early US offers of joint development, preferring instead a loose collaborative effort.
9 By November 1943, a number of British-organized scientists were involved either directly or indirectly in the Manhattan Project, including Neils Bohr, Otto Frisch, Rudolf Peierls, James Chadwick, William Penney, George Placzek, P.B. Moon, James Tuck, Egon Bretscher and Klaus Fuchs.
10
The closeness of the Anglo-US relationship would erode over time, despite its affirmation in the 1943 Quebec Agreement and the 1944 Hyde Park Aide-Memoire.
11 Manhattan Project director General Leslie Groves sought to limit British involvement early on, in October 1942.
12
The British were further cut off in 1943 when Washington was concerned that the British would pass on sensitive information to the USSR, either overtly 13 or as a result of espionage. 14 Congress became increasingly determined, after the use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that the US seek to monopolize the technology for as long as possible. 15 The US was concerned very early on with nuclear proliferation, particularly after the first use of nuclear weapons. 16 What collaboration there was between the UK and the US ended in April 1946 with a preliminary study of thermonuclear weapons.
17
France likely benefited from its oblique involvement in the Manhattan project. Pierre Auger headed the physics department at the Montreal Laboratories, the largest nuclear weapons project outside the US, and Lew Kowarski was responsible for the first reactor to go critical at Chalk River.
18 Free French General Charles de Gaulle was kept informed by Auger, Kowarski, Goldschmitt and others, and was considering the political ramifications of nuclear technology as early as 1944. 19 Groves believed that the British had violated the Quebec Agreement's clause against dissemination of nuclear information to third parties, by allowing nuclear information to be passed to the French. 20 However, France's limited access denied it precise technical information.
21

German-Japanese nuclear cooperation
Germany and Japan each had nascent nuclear weapons programs (Japan had two, a Navy and an Army program), and the less advanced but more committed Japanese program led Tokyo to seek assistance early on. 22 Germany's War Office centralized fissile and heavy water production as early as 1940, and Japan did the same within its capacity in 1941. 23 The Japanese believed, correctly, that the Germans would not
